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SOIL AND CITIZENSHIP 
Linda Bosniak* 
 
The issue of targeted government killing of U.S. citizens within the 
national territory garnered an intense burst of attention earlier this year 
when Senator Rand Paul staged a memorable thirteen-hour filibuster during 
the John Brennan confirmation hearings.1  After the al-Awlaki 
assassinations in Yemen, Rand Paul demanded to know if the government 
claimed authority to kill citizens here at home as well, and initially received 
an evasive answer.2  In response, Paul promised to 
speak as long as it takes until the alarm is sounded from coast to coast that 
our Constitution is important, that your rights to trial by jury are precious, 
[and] that no American should be killed by a drone on American soil 
without first being charged with a crime, [and] found . . . guilty by a 
court.3 
Attorney General Eric Holder eventually conceded that targeting any 
U.S. citizen for assassination within national territory (in the absence of 
imminent threat) is out of bounds.4  Meanwhile, Rand Paul himself 
retreated from the blazing purity of his position a few weeks later when he 
said in an interview that, actually, “If there’s a killer on the loose in a 
neighborhood, I’m not against drones being used.”5 
 
*  Distinguished Professor of Law, Rutgers School of Law.  These remarks were made 
during the Citizenship, Immigration, and National Security After 9/11 Symposium at 
Fordham University School of Law on September 20, 2013.  The text of her remarks has 
been lightly edited. 
 1. 159 CONG. REC. S1150 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 2013) (statement of Sen. Rand Paul). 
 2. Conor Friedersdorf, Killing Americans on U.S. Soil:  Eric Holder’s Evasive, 
Manipulative Letter, ATLANTIC (Mar. 6, 2013, 6:00 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/
politics/archive/2013/03/killing-americans-on-us-soil-eric-holders-evasive-manipulative-
letter/273749/. 
 3. 159 CONG. REC. S1150. 
 4. See Rachel Weiner, Aaron Blake & Philip Rucker, Eric Holder Responds to Rand 
Paul With ‘No,’ Paul Satisfied, WASH. POST (Mar. 7, 2103, 2:02 PM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2013/03/07/white-house-obama-
would-not-use-drones-against-u-s-citizens-on-american-soil/; see also Attorney General Eric 
Holder, Address at Northwestern University School of Law (Mar. 5, 2012), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-1203051.html. 
 5. Cavuto (Fox Business Network television broadcast Apr. 22, 2013) (interview with 
Sen. Rand Paul), available at http://www.paul.senate.gov/?p=video&id=777.  Senator 
Lindsey Graham had taken this position all along:  “‘Wouldn’t that be kind of crazy to 
exempt the homeland, the biggest prize for the terrorists, to say for some reason the military 
can’t defend America here in an appropriate circumstance?’ Graham asked at the hearing.” 
Sara Sorcher, What Was Behind Rand Paul’s Filibuster of John Brennan, NAT’L J. (Mar. 6, 
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Still, Senator Paul’s filibuster was a reverberant moment in contemporary 
cultural politics.  The prospect that the government might “kill Americans 
on American soil”6 resonated; in fact, it became a raging meme and a 
source of political panic that galvanized both right and left.  That the 
government might assassinate its citizens here at home was portrayed as an 
utterly egregious and terrifying possibility.  In response to his protest, 
people from across the political spectrum announced their intent to “Stand 
With Rand.”7 
The question of the legitimacy of any domestic assassination practice is 
obviously urgent.  But for me here, the filibuster episode provides a useful 
context for thinking about some of the ways that a person’s location and a 
person’s legal status intersect to determine both rights and perceived ethical 
standing.  Gerald Neuman and Kal Raustiala, among others, have 
powerfully examined the complex location-status nexus in the 
constitutional setting.8  I am interested in the Constitution as well, but my 
focus extends to political and ethical thought more broadly.  Here, I want to 
talk about the structure of conventional normative thinking on the subject of 
status, location, and perceptions of deservingness—using Rand Paul’s 
filibuster as a launching point. 
First, to set the scene, a few words about the law.  Many of you know 
that the U.S. Supreme Court made clear, more than five decades ago in a 
case called Reid v. Covert,9 that it is indefensibly arbitrary to make a 
citizen’s constitutional rights turn on where she or he is physically located 
at a given moment.10  As Justice Black wrote in Reid, when “the 
Government reaches out to punish a citizen who is abroad,” that citizen’s 
constitutional rights cannot “be stripped away just because he happens to be 
in another land.”11 
The precept articulated in Reid—that there are, in Raustiala’s terms, “no 
longer geographical limits to the Constitution’s reach” for citizens12—has 
applied in standard law enforcement settings ever since.  It appears, 
however, that some in government do not regard this rule to extend to times 
 
2013), http://www.nationaljournal.com/daily/what-was-behind-rand-paul-s-filibuster-of-
john-brennan-20130306. 
 6. 159 CONG. REC. S1150 (emphasis added). 
 7. See STAND WITH RAND PAC, http://www.standwithrandpac.org/ (last visited Mar. 
25, 2014). 
 8. See generally KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG?  THE 
EVOLUTION OF TERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW 111–15 (2009); Gerald L. Neuman, 
Extraterritorial Rights and Constitutional Methodology After Rasul v. Bush, 153 U. PA. L. 
REV. 2073, 2076–77 (2005); Gerald L. Neuman, The Extraterritorial Constitution After 
Boumediene v. Bush, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 259, 282 (2009); Kal Raustiala, The Geography of 
Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2501 (2005). 
 9. 354 U.S. 1 (1957). 
 10. Id. at 7–8. 
 11. Id. at 6 (emphasis added). 
 12. RAUSTIALA, supra note 8, at 146. 
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of national emergency (whatever “emergency’s” scope is deemed to be).13  
In this current moment, the constitutional distinction between being here 
and being abroad may have been reinstated.14  But beyond the law itself, 
this reinstatement of normative territorial thinking is conspicuously 
detectable in political discourse.  Indeed, the impulse to defend the special 
normative significance of territorial presence is what fueled Rand Paul’s 
filibuster effort in the first place.  Although Senator Paul criticized the 
government’s al-Awlaki assassination in Yemen,15 his full-throated protest 
against the prospect of government “killing of American citizens on 
American soil” expressed the conviction that killing citizens at home would 
be more objectionable. 
Now, purely as a matter of legal logic, the idea that emergency should 
reimpose a territorialized conception of citizens’ rights makes little sense in 
law,16 and has mostly not represented government practice.17  If anything, 
emergencies have served to justify degradation of the due process rights of 
some citizens located within the national territory.18  Still, the visceral 
horror aroused by the prospect of domestic assassinations of citizens shows 
that many Americans specifically view domestic killing of U.S. citizens on 
U.S. territory as utterly beyond the pale. 
It is interesting to think about why this would be true.  Clearly, the 
filibuster episode became an irresistible opportunity for political posturing 
by various parties—but that is not enough of an explanation.  The filibuster 
spoke—and it was heard—in ways that both reflected and reinforced what I 
 
 13. See MARY L. DUDZIAK, WAR TIME:  AN IDEA, ITS HISTORY, ITS CONSEQUENCES 57–
58, 106, 122 (2012) (discussing moments when wartime was used to justify limitations on 
constitutional protections). 
 14. See, for example, Attorney General Holder’s ultimate position on drone 
assassinations of citizens—that it is sometimes acceptable abroad but never acceptable at 
home. See also Andrew Johnson, Obama Stands by Drone Strikes on U.S. Citizens, but Not 
on U.S. Soil, Looking into More Oversight, NAT’L REV. (May 23, 2013, 4:20 PM), 
http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/349186/obama-stands-drone-strikes-us-citizens-
looking-more-oversight-andrew-johnson; see also President Barack Obama, Address at the 
National Defense University (May 23, 2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university (“[W]hen a U.S. 
citizen goes abroad to wage war against America and . . . when neither the United States, nor 
our partners are in a position to capture him before he carries out a plot, his citizenship 
should no more serve as a shield than a sniper shooting down on an innocent crowd should 
be protected from a SWAT team.”).  President Obama went on to state that he would have 
been “derelict” in his duty if the United States did not take action against al-Awlaki. Id. 
 15. 159 CONG. REC. S1150, S1164 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 2013) (statement of Sen. Rand 
Paul) (discussing how al-Awlaki should have instead been tried for treason in federal court). 
 16. Kal Raustiala, White Paper Suggests U.S. Could Launch Drones into U.S. Cities, 
DAILY BEAST (Feb. 17, 2013), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/02/16/white-
paper-suggests-u-s-could-launch-drones-into-u-s-cities.html (“[W]hether a drone strike that 
kills a citizen comports with due process or not has essentially the same answer if the target 
is in Toronto or Detroit. . . .  [T]here is no legal reason the operative could not be killed 
during a difficult capture attempt, wherever he might be.”). 
 17. See generally RAUSTIALA, supra note 8. 
 18. See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004); see also Glenn Greenwald, 
Three Democratic Myths Used To Demean the Paul Filibuster, GUARDIAN (Mar. 10, 
2013, 10:24 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/mar/10/paul-filibuster-
drones-progressives. 
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suggest remains an entrenched, ethical territoriality19 in political 
consciousness.  Even if it seems absurd in liberal terms to make a citizen’s 
rights turn on where he or she happens to be,20 that is not the dominant 
common sense. 
Rather, the prevailing common sense can be discerned in discursive 
framings and linguistic choices.  Notice that one of the ways Rand Paul’s 
filibuster did its resonating work was through repeated use of the word soil.  
Once again, his stated goal was to ensure that the government would not 
“kill Americans on American soil.”  Of course, the word “soil” is a 
common metonym for the nation-state.  Yet, it has very specific overtones:  
it conveys an organicized, even primordialized conception of national 
territory.  Literally, soil implies rootedness:  deep and natural belonging.21  
And its essentialism does a lot of galvanizing work:  there is something 
about the idea of being on American soil (a bit like being in the 
“homeland”) that seems to emotively trump the critique of locational 
arbitrariness.22 
Admittedly, determining whether someone is, in fact, “on American soil” 
is itself subject to dispute and manipulation.  The line between domestic 
and foreign territory is often contested (as well as gerrymandered) in law 
and in theory.23  Still, there are plenty of situations that are not disputed; 
sometimes it is clear whether a citizen is or is not on national soil.  For 
example, both al-Awlaki father and son—both citizens—were not on U.S. 
soil when they were assassinated without due process by U.S. drones.24  
And the fact that they were not in the United States has been treated by 
many as normatively consequential.25 
Now, in thinking about the effects of territoriality on citizens’ rights, 
keep in mind—and this is parenthetical, but crucial—that for noncitizens, or 
aliens, constitutional rights have been held to depend on territorial 
presence.26  As constitutional persons, noncitizens are protected rights 
holders, but only so long as they are territorially here.  There is much room 
 
 19. Linda Bosniak, Being Here:  Ethical Territoriality and the Rights of Immigrants, 8 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 389 (2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1126427. 
 20. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957). 
 21. Lisa Malkki, National Geographic:  The Rooting of Peoples and the 
Territorialization of National Identity Among Scholars and Refugees, 7 CULTURAL 
ANTHROPOLOGY 24 (1992) (describing botanical metaphors in political discourse). 
 22. Indeed, sacral quality of the soil was also evidenced in discourse regarding the burial 
of the body of Tamerlan Tsarnaev (one of the alleged “Boston bombers”). See Leti Volpp, 
The Boston Bombers, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2205 (2014). 
 23. See Bosniak, supra note 19, at 405–06. 
 24. See Jo Becker & Scott Shane, Secret ‘Kill List’ Proves a Test of Obama’s Principles 
and Will, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2012, at A1; Letter from Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney Gen., to 
Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate (May 22, 2013), available 
at http://www.justice.gov/ag/AG-letter-5-22-13.pdf. 
 25. See J. David Goodman, Awlaki Killing Incites Criticism on Left and Libertarian 
Right, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2011, 1:35 PM), http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/30/
awlaki-killing-sparks-criticism-on-left-and-libertarian-right/. 
 26. See Bosniak, supra note 19, at 390, 408. 
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for argument about the legitimacy of this territorialist rule, which has 
served to permit unconstrained exercises of national power on noncitizens 
abroad.27  At the same time, though, this territorialism has been highly 
protective for many noncitizens already present.  True, aliens are subject to 
extraordinary national power governing whether they can be, or remain 
within national territory at all.28  But as Justice William Brennan stated in 
Plyler v. Doe,29 so long as an alien is present in the country—so long as he 
“‘may happen to be’” here (this, notice, is an echo of the “happens to be” 
language of Reid)—then “the simple fact of his presence . . . [makes him] 
entitled to . . . equal protection [and due process].”30  In other words, for 
noncitizens, access to protection and concern has turned on where they are, 
as distinct from citizens, for whom access to protection and concern has 
purportedly turned on who they are, irrespective of where.  And yet this 
drone assassination episode illustrates that location continues to be 
understood to matter for citizens too. 
So, what follows?  Here are a few brief thoughts about this citizenship-
soil-deservingness nexus. 
First, if Anwar al-Awlaki had been on rather than off American soil, his 
assassination without due process by the U.S. government would have been 
deemed by many to be normatively worse than it was understood to be.  
The fact that he “happened to be in another land” (in Reid’s phrase) affected 
the overall normative assessment.  Yes, the assassination was criticized by 
some commentators,31 but as noted above, the discourse quickly shifted to 
the apparently more pressing question of whether the government claimed 
authority to assassinate citizens here at home. 
Second, however, notice that precisely by virtue of his citizenship (he 
was born in New Mexico), al-Awlaki could have been inside rather than 
outside U.S. territory in 2011.  Unlike an alien, he theoretically had 
unqualified access to U.S. territorial presence.  If he had been on U.S. soil, 
he might well have been detained and prosecuted on various grounds but 
(according, now, to the government) he would not have been fair game for 
summary execution.  The fact that he chose absence from the soil, therefore, 
resulted in a detriment to him—both in fact and in the moral economy of 
concern and outrage.  We see here the inscription of a normative divide 
among citizens based on location.  Arguably such a divide serves as a kind 
of functional penalty on the citizen’s right to travel.  Whether a citizen 
“happens to be abroad” indeed matters vitally. 
 
 27. See, e.g., id. at 393–94; see also sources cited supra note 8. 
 28. I bracket the case of the younger Al-Awlaki (also a citizen), whose killing appears to 
have been accidental. See Sabrina Siddiqui, Obama ‘Surprised,’ ‘Upset’ When Anwar Al-
Awlaki’s Teenage Son Was Killed by U.S. Drone Strike, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 24, 
2011, 11:40 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/23/obama-anwar-al-awlaki-
son_n_3141688.html. 
 29. 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
 30. Id. at 215 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1033 (1866)). 
 31. See supra notes 15, 25 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 4–6 and 
accompanying text. 
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Third, however, al-Awlaki’s very citizenship implicates its own bitter 
disputes.  While some critics lambasted his killing in Yemen on grounds 
that a government should never kill its own anywhere, others, like 
Representative Tom Tancredo, responded that al-Awlaki was not truly a 
U.S. citizen at all.32  The fact that Anwar’s parents, then foreign students, 
“happened to be” on American soil at the time of his birth cannot, on this 
view, properly ground his national membership.  While this argument has 
no merit constitutionally,33 it articulates what has been a persistent 
objection to birthright citizenship more generally34—one captured well in 
Peter Spiro’s phrase “happenstance” citizenship.35 
What critics of happenstance citizenship seem to demand is a more 
rigorous relationship between citizen and soil.36  In this respect, the critique 
shares elements with the ideology of “autochthony,” which has recently 
roiled a number of African and European countries.  The word autochthony 
literally means “to be born from the soil.”37  Politically, claims of 
autochthony are claims for the priority of soil-rootedness as the basis of 
belonging, and for exclusion of those who are deemed strangers to the 
soil.38  Discussion of autochthony may seem inapplicable to us here given 
the United States’ self-identity as a nation of immigrants.  It might also 
seem paradoxical in light of the American-settler nation’s disregard and 
destruction of natives’ ties to the land.39  Nevertheless, I think the concept 
is germane to our jus soli debates to the extent that it counterposes authentic 
to inauthentic relations between citizens and soil.  
And even where invocations of national soil are read in less literal and 
primordial terms, the critique of happenstance citizenship still demands a 
more meaningful anchoring of citizenship to national place.  “Being here,” 
in this view, cannot be merely a matter of physical location on a spatial grid 
but must entail embeddedness in a national project.  In this discourse, 
territoriality—along with citizenship—must be normatively thick. 
 
 32. Tom Tancredo, Anwar al-Awlaki and the Perils of Birthright Citizenship, DAILY 
CALLER (Oct. 11, 2011, 3:24 PM), available at http://dailycaller.com/2011/10/11/anwar-al-
awlaki-and-the-perils-of-birthright-citizenship/#ixzz2r0PzG8g8. 
 33. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 654 (1898) (holding that an 
individual born in the United States becomes a citizen at the time of his birth for purposes of 
the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 34. Actually, Rand Paul himself is one of those critics:  In 2011, he sponsored a 
constitutional amendment that would deny citizenship to people like al-Alwaki—whose 
parents were not citizens, lawful permanent residents, or members of the military. 
 35. PETER J. SPIRO, BEYOND CITIZENSHIP:  AMERICAN IDENTITY AFTER GLOBALIZATION 
19–22 (2008).  Note that citizenship attributed via descent (jus sanguinis) is as much 
happenstance as territorial birthright citizenship (jus soli). 
 36. As a matter of fact, al-Awlaki’s connection to “American soil” was not momentary 
but extended for several years into his childhood. 
 37. 1 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 801–02 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner eds., 2d ed. 
1989). 
 38. See generally PETER GESCHIERE, THE PERILS OF BELONGING:  AUTOCHTHONY, 
CITIZENSHIP, AND EXCLUSION IN AFRICA AND EUROPE (2009). 
 39. For a brief timeline of Indian removal, see Indian Removal Timeline, DIGITAL HIST., 
http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/active_learning/explorations/indian_removal/removal_time
line.cfm (last visited Mar. 25, 2014). 
2014] SOIL AND CITIZENSHIP 2075 
To conclude:  the Reid court criticizes making citizens’ rights contingent 
on the happenstance of territorial presence and absence.  Tancredo and 
others criticize making the grant of citizenship contingent on the 
happenstance of parents’ territorial presence at the time of a child’s birth.  
Both are protests against giving legal effect to the contingency of location.  
But in the Rand Paul filibuster moment, such contingencies were not 
challenged.  Instead, where, as well as who, we happen to be is regarded as 
essential.  National citizens on national soil are our core political subjects in 
our core political space, and these subjects’ protection requires heroic 
measures against existential government threat. 
 
